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Abstract We often rely on other people’s help to
accomplish tasks and to attain goals. People, however,
diVer in their physical action capabilities. Some persons are
therefore better able to provide help than others. We inves-
tigated 2.5-, 3.5-, and 5-year-old children’s ability to take
other person’s action capabilities in a helping situation into
account. To this end, they observed a protagonist who
needed the help of friends to accomplish several tasks. For
each task, two friends were available, but only one was
physically able to provide the help. Children were asked to
indicate, which partner the protagonist will ask for help.
Our results showed a developmental eVect with children in
the older two groups performing signiWcantly better than
those in the youngest group. Additionally, we found evi-
dence that the 5-year-olds outperformed the younger age
groups in their ability to justify their choice. Our Wndings
thus suggest that children’s ability to consider others’ phys-
ical action capabilities in helping situations develops
around 3 years of age. The results are interpreted in terms
of children’s ability to perceive others’ aVordances. The
implication of these Wndings for theories on the develop-
ment of action understanding and joint action are discussed.
Keywords Prosocial behavior · Development · Helping · 
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Introduction
Imagine searching around for a lost object. Eventually you
see it on the top of a high cupboard, but it is too high for
you to reach. Luckily, there are some people around you
whom you could ask for help. Clearly, as you want to
retrieve an object from a high cupboard, you would ask the
taller person to help you, but not the smaller person. As this
example nicely illustrates, the ability to correctly judge
other people’s action capabilities plays an important role in
our social life, not only in collaborative but also in compet-
itive situations. Whereas adults indubitably possess a cer-
tain proWciency in taking others’ action capabilities into
account when looking for help, almost nothing is known
about the development of this ability in childhood.
Generally, young children rely on other persons’ help to
a great extent. It is well established that young children
show social referencing behavior when they are uncertain
about situations (e.g., Moore 2006; Walden and Ogan
1988), and they seek information (e.g., Baldwin and Moses
1996) and help from others to accomplish tasks and attain
goals (e.g., Newman 2000; Puustinen 1998). However, as
illustrated by the presented example, proper functioning in
a dynamic social environment requires sophisticated
knowledge about with whom to interact to attain a goal and
whom to ask for help or for information in certain
situations.
Interestingly, recent research on children’s selective
social learning has indicated that preschoolers use informa-
tion about the success of a person’s past actions (Birch
et al. 2008), or the past accuracy of information provided
by a person (Corriveau and Harris 2009; Pasquini et al.
2007), to decide on whom to rely when diVerent persons
oVer conXicting information. For example, it has been
shown that 4- but not 3-year-old children selectively trusted
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a previously correct person in a word-learning situation,
when he gave diVerent information than a previously incor-
rect or ignorant speaker (Koenig and Harris 2005). Interest-
ingly, a person’s past accuracy seems to be more important
than an actor’s age as preschoolers rely more on a previ-
ously accurate person than on an older person (Jaswal and
Neely  2006). Furthermore, selective learning is not
restricted to the acquisition of novel words. Rakoczy and
colleagues (Rakoczy et al. 2009) showed that 4-year-old
children also preferred to learn novel rules (i.e., normative
appropriate actions) from a previously reliable model com-
pared with an unreliable one.
The reviewed literature provides evidence for preschool
children’s selective reliance on persons when acquiring
novel knowledge. Whereas these studies have provided
important insights, research has neglected the domain of
others’ physical action capabilities. Research with adults has
shown that humans are quite proWcient in estimating other
people’s action capabilities (e.g., StoVregen et al. 1999), and
subsequent research, informed by Ecological Psychology
(e.g., Marsh et al. 2009; Richardson et al. 2008), has sug-
gested that such an estimation is based on the detection of
action-relevant properties of other agents in relation to their
environment (i.e., action aVordances; Ramenzoni et al.
2008). Knowledge about the development of this ability is of
relevance for developmental psychologists as it provides
insight into children’s ability to select appropriate persons
when seeking help (e.g., when we need to retrieve some-
thing from a high cupboard). Furthermore, this domain is of
relevance for researchers interested in the development of
the ability to engage successfully in joint action because
eYcient interaction with others relies on an appropriate eval-
uation of their action capabilities (Sebanz et al. 2006).
The present study investigated the development of chil-
dren’s understanding of others’ action capabilities. To be
able to examine systematically children’s evaluations of
other’s action capabilities across a number of diVerent per-
son characteristics (e.g., such as strength or height), we
decided to employ a third-person helping task in which
dolls represented the actor as well as possible helpers in a
number of diVerent situations (for comparable third-person
approaches see, for example, Fawcett and Markson 2010a,
b; Olson and Spelke 2008; Vaish et al. 2011). In particular,
children were introduced to a protagonist who needed the
help of others in Wve tasks. For example, one task required
retrieving a displayed item, while another task involved
carrying a heavy object. In every situation, two friends of
the protagonist were present. In each case, only one of the
friends was able to provide the help as only he/she was, for
example, tall or strong enough.
To examine children’s ability to choose the adequate
person for help, we assessed their judgments of which of
the friends the actor would ask for help. Furthermore, chil-
dren were asked to justify their choice. A comparison
between both measures would be informative with respect
to the possible social-cognitive mechanisms that underlie
children’s developing ability to evaluate others’ action
capabilities. If children were able to choose correctly the
adequate helper before they were able to justify their
choice, this would suggest that their ability to evaluate oth-
ers’ action capabilities is initially more practical form of
knowledge that over developmental time becomes expli-
cated in conceptual or discursive knowledge (KarmiloV-
Smith 1992; for detailed epistemological analyses of this
account see Brandom 1994; Habermas 1985). However, if
there was no developmental lag between the two measures,
this would indicate that even at its developmental origin,
this knowledge is of conceptual nature (for a similar discus-
sion concerning the cognitive mechanisms behind chil-
dren’s selective learning from other people see Koenig and
Jaswal 2011; Lucas and Lewis 2010). As it has been sug-
gested that children from 3 years on are able to estimate
other people’s reachability space (Rochat 1995), we inves-
tigated 2.5-, 3.5-, and 5-year-old children.
Method
Participants
The  Wnal sample of the study consisted of 36 children,
including twelve 2.5-year-old children (range: 2 years,
5.8 months–2 years, and 11.3 months; 6 boys), twelve 3.5-
year-old children (range: 3 years, 5.2 months–3 years, and
10.7 months; 7 boys), and twelve 5-year-old children (range:
4 years, 6.2 months–5 years, and 4.2 months; 7 boys). The
participants were recruited from a database of parents who
volunteered to participate in psychological studies, all being
native English speakers from heterogeneous socioeconomic
background in Nova Scotia, Canada. Informed consent for
participation was given by the children’s parents. The fami-
lies received a certiWcate for their visit.
Tasks and materials
Children were presented with ten dolls over the course of
the Wve tasks (see Fig. 1). One doll represented the protago-
nist (Piglet). In every task, two dolls represented friends of
Piglet. The tasks were performed by one experimenter and
varied in the type of problem that the protagonist encoun-
tered and the type of action capability required. Action
capability was varied between the two dolls that repre-
sented Piglet’s friends. Every task started with Piglet
appearing in the scene, greeting his friends, and subse-
quently either trying, but failing to perform an action or
announcing that he was not able to perform the action.Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:593–600 595
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After admitting that he could not perform the action him-
self, he articulated that he could ask one of his friends for
help. He subsequently approached his friends. The experi-
menter asked the child to show him which of his two
friends Piglet would ask for help, using the same test ques-
tion: “What do you think: Which of his friends is Piglet
going to ask for help?” If the child did not react, the ques-
tion was repeated in another wording: “Who is Piglet going
to ask for help?” If the child made the correct choice, he or
she was further asked to justify why Piglet would ask this
friend and not the other. The order of tasks was balanced
among participants with the exception of the balcony task
and the dog’s house task; as both tasks involved the same
dolls, they were always presented after each other.
The balcony task (Out of reach)
A tall and a small princess were standing in front of a toy
house. Piglet entered the scene with two objects in his hand.
He greeted the princesses and started playing with his
objects. Suddenly, another actor (Elmo) showed up, took
one of the objects, and put it on the balcony of the toy
house. Piglet expressed sadness that the object was gone
and tried to get it back. He reached for it, but was not tall
enough to get it. He admitted that he could not get it and
might need the help of one of his friends.
The dog’s house task (Small hole)
The same princesses were standing in front of the house.
Piglet continued to play with his items. Elmo showed up
again, took the other object, and put it into the dog’s house.
Piglet expressed sadness that the object was gone and tried
to get it back. He tried to get into the dog’s house, but was
not small enough to enter it. He admitted that he could not
get his object and might need the help of one of his friends.
The basket task (Two hands)
Two men were standing in front of the house. The dolls
were identical apart from the fact that one had a sling
around his arm and neck as if he had broken his arm. Piglet
entered by jumping onto the table carrying a basket with
two handles. He greeted the men and asked them how they
have been doing. Whereas one expressed that he was enjoy-
ing the day, the other said that he had broken his arm and
cannot do anything with it. Piglet then picked up the basket
again, taking each handle with one hand while verbalizing
that he needed one hand for each handle. He carried it
around, but stopped after a couple of seconds and
announced that the basket is very heavy. He admitted that
he could not carry it and might need some help from one of
his friends.
The letter task (Reading task)
Two girls were standing in front of the house. The dolls
were identical besides the fact that one had a blindfold over
her eyes. Piglet entered the table with a piece of paper in his
hand. He greeted the girls and asked what they were doing.
The girl who was not blindfolded announced that she had
blindfolded her sister to play a game with her. She danced
around her sister and asked her, if she could see her. The
blindfolded sister responded that she could not. Thereupon,
the girl who was not blindfolded asked Piglet, if he wanted
to join, but Piglet declined. He told the girls that he had just
received a letter from his mother and would like to know
what is written on this letter. He admitted that he could not
read it and might need the help of one of his friends.
The wall task (Heavy object)
Two men were standing in front of the house. Both dolls
showed shirtless men, of which one was clearly more mus-
cular than the other. Piglet entered the scene. He greeted the
men and asked them how they have been doing. The less
muscular man responded that he was enjoying the day,
whereas the other responded that he has recently won a prize
for being the strongest man in Canada and invited Piglet to
feel his muscles. Piglet felt his muscles and then announced
that he has to get some work done, in particular, that he has
to move a wall. When repeatedly trying to move it, the wall
moved only slightly. Piglet admitted that he could not move
it and might need some help from one of his friends.
Fig. 1 The Wgure displays the stimuli used in the experiment. The doll
in the front shows the main protagonist Piglet. The dolls behind Piglet
show (from left to right) the two male dolls used in the basket task, the
two princesses used in the balcony and the dog’s house task, the two
male dolls used in the wall task, and the two girls used in the letter task.
The doll on the top of the toy house is Elmo who has been employed
for the balcony and the dog’s house task596 Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:593–600
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Coding and analysis
All sessions were videotaped and coded by the Wrst author
of the study. A research assistant who was unaware of the
hypothesis of the study coded a random sample of 33% of
each age group’s data. First, we coded which of the two
friends were chosen by participants as the one whom Piglet
will ask for help. A value of 1 was assigned for every task if
participants choose the appropriate doll (i.e., the taller doll
for retrieving an object from the balcony) by either verbally
indicating grasping or clearly pointing (to) this doll. A
value of 0 was assigned for the incorrect choice. Subse-
quently, the results were summed per child and divided by
the number of tasks to yield a total correct score (choice
value). A correlational analysis (based on the choice values
per child) showed a perfect agreement between both raters,
r =1 ,   P < 0.001. Data were analyzed for age eVects
employing a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
the between-subjects factor age group (2.5, 3.5, 5 years).
Furthermore, we employed independent samples t tests for
every group (corrected by the Bonferroni procedure) to
assess whether children’s performance diVered from
chance level.
Second, we analyzed the justiWcations of all trials in
which the participants had chosen the correct doll. The jus-
tiWcations were coded as either being appropriate or not
(see Fig. 2b). An appropriate answer was deWned as being
relevant and precise. That means that an appropriate answer
must point to the information that is relevant for the situa-
tion and it must be precise with respect to this important
person characteristic (e.g., when in the balcony task, the
participant answered: “this doll is taller than the other”,
“she is tall enough”). If the child’s answer was not appro-
priate, the answer was further coded as being only relevant
but not precise (e.g., “because he needs help”, “because she
can get the candle”), only precise but not relevant (e.g.,
“because she is a princess”, “because he wears pants”),
explicit statement of ignorance (e.g., “I don’t know”),
something else (e.g., “Look. There.”), or no answer given
(see Fig. 2c). A justiWcation value was deWned for each par-
ticipant based on the proportion of trials in which a relevant
and precise answer was given. An interrater reliability anal-
ysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to determine
consistency among raters. The analysis yielded a good level
of agreement ( =0 . 8 0 ,  P < 0.001). Data were analyzed
employing an ANOVA with the between-subjects factor
age group (2.5, 3.5, and 5 years).
Results
Figure 2a displays the averages of the choice values per age
group. A preliminary analysis yielded no signiWcant diVer-
ences between tasks (Cochran’s Q(4) = 2.250, P =0 . 6 9 ;  s e e
Table 1). The analysis yielded a signiWcant eVect of age
group, F(2, 33) = 15.152, P < 0.001, p
2 =0.48.  Post-hoc
t tests revealed that the performances of the 2.5-year-olds
diVered signiWcantly from the 3.5- and 5-year-olds,
t(22) = 3.081,  P <0 . 0 1  a n d  t(22) = 7.601,  P < 0.001,
respectively, whereas no signiWcant diVerences were found
Fig. 2 a Shows the average 
choice value (i.e., average cor-
rect choice) for the 2.5-, 3.5-, 
and 5-year-old children. Error 
bars indicate standard error of 
the means. The bold horizontal 
line emphasizes the 50% value 
(i.e., chance performance). 
b Shows the average justiWca-
tion value for the 2.5-, 3.5-, and 
5-year-old children. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the 
means. c Gives a more detailed 
overview over the diVerent cate-
gories of answers provided by 
the 2.5-, 3.5-, and 5-year-old 
children in the justiWcation ques-
tion. The light gray bar repre-
sents the performances of the 
2.5-year-old children, the inter-
mediate gray bar represents the 
performances of the 3.5-year-old 
children, and the dark gray bar 
represents the performances of 
the 5-year-old childrenExp Brain Res (2011) 211:593–600 597
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between these age groups, t(22) = 1.658,  P = 0.11. The
t tests against chance level showed that the performances of
the 3.5-year-olds, t(11) = 4.318, P < 0.005) and of the 5-
year-olds diVered from chance, t(11) = 20.765, P <0 . 0 0 1 ,
but the performance of the 2.5-year-olds1 did not
t(11) = 1.000, P =0 . 3 4 .
Next, we analyzed the justiWcation values (i.e., the fre-
quency of relevant and precise justiWcations in trials in
which participants had chosen the correct doll). The analy-
sis of the justiWcation values revealed a signiWcant eVect of
age group, F(2, 33) = 13.054, P < 0.001, p
2 =0.44.  Post-
hoc t tests showed that the performance of the 5-year-olds
(M = 97.9%, SD = 7.2) diVered signiWcantly from the 3.5-
and 2.5-year-olds (M = 56.1%, SD = 41.1, and M = 29.2%,
SD = 39.6, respectively), t(22) = 3.476,  P < 0.01, and
t(22) = 5.910, P < 0.001, respectively, whereas no signiW-
cant diVerences was found between the latter age groups,
t(22) = 1.634, P =0 . 1 2 .
Discussion
The goal of this study was to assess the development of
children’s ability to take other person’s action capabilities
in a helping situation into account. To this end, 2.5-, 3.5-,
and 5-year-old children observed a protagonist who needed
the help of friends to accomplish several tasks. Typically,
only one of the friends was physically able to provide the
help. Our results showed a signiWcant developmental eVect
with children in the two older groups performing signiW-
cantly better than those in the youngest group. Furthermore,
children in the two older groups chose the appropriate char-
acter at levels well above chance, whereas the performance
of the younger children did not diVer from chance. We may
infer, therefore, that the 3.5- and 5-year-old, but not the 2.5-
year-old children were able to choose the appropriate doll
for help. We interpret our Wndings as evidence that chil-
dren’s ability to consider others’ action capabilities in help-
ing situations develops at least around 3 years of age.
In the following, we will Wrst discuss the relation of our
Wndings to the literature on selective social learning in pre-
school children. Then, we will discuss the impact of the
task on children’s performance, and the possible mecha-
nisms that could subserve children’s performance in the
choice and the justiWcation measure. Finally, the implica-
tions of our results for theories on the development of
action perception and joint actions are considered.
Our results add to recent Wndings on children’s selective
reliance on other people in social learning tasks (e.g., Birch
et al. 2008; Clement et al. 2004; Koenig and Harris 2005;
Pasquini et al. 2007; Sobel and Corriveau 2010; Sodian
et al. 2006). In particular, it has been found that 3- to 4-
year-old children monitor others’ past performances and
selectively learned novel object labels from the previously
more accurate person (Koenig et al. 2004). Furthermore,
selective learning is not restricted to language acquisition.
Birch and colleagues (2008) provided evidence that pre-
school children also selectively relied on a previously accu-
rate person to acquire knowledge about a novel object’s
function. Our results extend these Wndings to the realm of
physical action capabilities by demonstrating that by
3.5 years of age children take physical action capabilities
into account when assessing situations in which someone
needs others’ help.
It should be noted that we employed a third-person
approach to study children’s developing ability to evaluate
others’ physical action capabilities. Employing such an
approach enabled us to examine children’s performances
across a number of diverse tasks that assessed diVerent per-
son characteristics. This allows us to rule out that the devel-
opmental trends in our results are restricted to one kind of
physical action capability (e.g., strength but not height).
However, even though developmental research on chil-
dren’s social-cognitive development has successfully used
tasks that employed dolls (e.g., Fawcett and Markson
2010a) or photos (Shutts et al. 2010) to depict human
actors, it would be interesting to explore the impact of
diVerent kind of tasks on children’s ability to evaluate oth-
ers’ action capabilities. In particular, future research is nec-
essary to investigate whether children would show earlier
success in a task in which the children need to seek help for
1 To ensure that 2.5-year-olds’ failure was not merely due to the verbal
demands of the task, we randomly asked eight participants in one of the
tasks, in which they failed to choose the appropriate doll, to show what
the chosen doll has to do to help Piglet. Seven out of the eight partici-
pants correctly initiated the appropriate action (e.g., choosing the
weaker doll in the wall task to move the heavy object). This suggests
that the participants understood the task.
Table 1 Displays the results by 
age group (rows) and task 
(columns)
Balcony 
task (%)
Dog’s house 
task (%)
Basket 
task (%)
Letter 
task (%)
Wall 
task (%)
2.5 years 33 67 67 58 50
3.5 years 83 67 83 92 92
5 years 100 100 100 92 100
Each cell shows the average 
performance of children of a 
particular age group in a task598 Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:593–600
123
themselves and can choose among possible helpers whose
action capabilities diVer. Notwithstanding this possibility,
our results point to an important developmental lag
between children’s ability to choose the appropriate person
for help and to justify their choices.
The present Wnding raises the question of how this abil-
ity develops. DiVerent mechanisms have been suggested to
aVect and subserve the processing of other’s actions. In par-
ticular, two possible mechanisms might underlie this ability
and will be discussed in the following paragraphs: motor
resonance and aVordance perception.
Within a motor simulation account, it has been proposed
that observers use their own agentive action experiences
and action capabilities to process information about other
people’s actions (Wilson and Knoblich 2005). Although
previous research with adults and young children has pro-
vided evidence for an impact of one’s own action capabili-
ties on their action perception (e.g., Eskenazi et al. 2009;
Paulus et al. 2011b), it is unlikely that this mechanism can
be the main cause for children’s improvement in the per-
ception of others’ action capabilities as there are no obvious
motor developments around 3 years of age that could aVect
the perception of such diVerent properties as strength and
height or the use of one or both hands.
Alternatively, research has emphasized the role of per-
ceptual information and especially of aVordance perception
in the evaluation of others’ action capabilities (e.g., Mark
2007; Rochat 1995; StoVregen et al. 1999). In particular, it
has been argued that “action understanding and prediction
may reXect a situated, online sensitivity to optical informa-
tion, especially in the case of predicting possibilities for
action” (Ramenzoni et al. 2008, p. 1060). Based on these
Wndings, one could argue that, for example, the aVordance
for grasping the object on the balcony in one of our tasks
was diVerent for the tall compared with the small person.
The fact that only 3.5-year-old children but not 2.5-year-old
children were able to choose the appropriate helper could
thus indicate that the ability to perceive the aVordances of
others’ actions develops around the fourth year of life. Is
this a reasonable explanation given the Wndings within the
object perception literature that already infants are able to
perceive the action aVordances for diVerent objects (e.g.,
Paulus and Hauf 2011; Gibson and Pick 2000)? Note that
our task diVers from studies on infants’ object perception,
in that, our study did not require the perception of the
actions the objects aVorded for the children themselves, but
rather the actions the objects aVorded for another person.
Furthermore, as they had to choose among two possible
helpers, they had to compare the actions aVorded by the
objects for two diVerent persons. Such a comparison likely
demands more cognitive resources and thus develops later
than the direct perception of object aVordances. However,
our results do not directly point to cognitive mechanism
underlying children’s behavior in the choice task. Further
research is necessary to investigate the impact of motor res-
onance and aVordance perception on children’s perception
of other people’s action capabilities.
The question of the cognitive mechanisms relates also to
a currently debated topic in the literature on children’s
selective learning (cf. Koenig and Jaswal 2011; Koenig and
Woodward 2010; Lucas and Lewis 2010). It has been dis-
cussed that children’s reliance on a more reliable actor in a
selective social learning task might be due to a general pref-
erence for this actor (i.e., a halo eVect) than due to an
expectation that this actor has speciWc knowledge that
another actor does not have (Koenig and Jaswal 2011).
Applied to our study, one could ask if children’s perfor-
mances might be due to a diVuse knowledge that, for exam-
ple, taller is better and that they therefore choose the taller
doll in the balcony task. Whereas this explanation cannot
be excluded for all of our tasks, a comparison of the bal-
cony task and the dog’s house task suggest that this is not
the case. In particular, for both tasks, the same dolls were
used (i.e., tall and small princess). Yet, in one task, the tall
princess and in the other task, the small princess was the
more appropriate helper. The fact that the majority of the
3.5-year-old children and all of the 5-year-old children
chose the appropriate doll in each task suggests that their
choices were not subserved by a general preference for the
tall or the small doll, but rather by more diVerentiated
knowledge about who was more appropriate for which task.
Our Wndings are thus in line with Wndings by Koenig and
Jaswal (2011) that children have a speciWc expectation for
which knowledge domain someone is expert in by showing
that they also have a speciWc expectation of what a person
can or cannot do.
Importantly, further insight into the nature of children’s
developing understanding of other people’s action capabili-
ties is provided by a comparison between the choice data
and the justiWcation data. Even though the 3.5- and 5-year-
olds performed at approximately the same level in terms of
choices alone, our analysis revealed profound age diVer-
ences in their ability to justify their choices. Justifying a
correct choice means explicating implicit or practical
knowledge in a discursive format (KarmiloV-Smith 1992;
see also Brandom 1994), a format that is open to reXection
and that allows assessment of the validity of reasons (cf.
Habermas 1985; Hacker 2006). The fact that the younger
children were able to adequately judge others’ action capa-
bilities without necessarily being able to justify their choice
is thus not only in line with other studies showing that chil-
dren’s justiWcations lag their judgments in development
(e.g., Thomas and Horton 1997; for a controversial discus-
sion of which criteria to use in the attribution of knowledge
to a child see also van der Maas et al. 2004; Smith 1992). It
also supports the theoretical notion that perceiving theExp Brain Res (2011) 211:593–600 599
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relation between an actor and the possible targets of his
action has to be conceived of being practical (or implicit)
knowledge that is not reXected in conceptual terms.
However, our research leaves open the question of what
mechanisms subserve the developing ability to justify one’s
own actions. It has been argued that children’s embedding
in social discourses plays a fundamental role in their cogni-
tive development (Nelson 2007; Vygotsky 1991). Support
for this theoretical approach comes from studies that show
relations between mothers’ and their children’s use of justi-
Wcations in disputes (Dunn and Munn 1987) or the impact
of training in exploratory talk on subsequent reasoning in
school children (Wegerif et al. 1999). Accordingly, chil-
dren’s ability to explicate their knowledge could be pro-
moted by their progressive embedding in discourses in
which they are asked to justify their actions. However, it
remains an open question whether children’s developing
justiWcation abilities are due to a general development in
reasoning skills (i.e., domain independent) or restricted to a
particular knowledge domain (see Sodian and Bullock
2008). Furthermore, in this study, we did not control for
general language or cognitive abilities. Even though our
results indicate that the 3.5-year-old children were able to
understand the question and to provide relevant answers,
indicating that their worse performances in the justiWcation
task were not due to lacking language skills, the precise
impact of children’s language skills on their task perfor-
mance remains an open question. Future research is neces-
sary to directly examine the development of justiWcation
skills in preschool children. Whatever the precise develop-
mental origin of this ability may be, our results provide
clear evidence that from 5 years on, children are able to
explicitly reason about another person’s action capabilities
when they have to decide whom to ask for help.
Our results have implications for research on children’s
developing action understanding and their ability to
engage in successful joint actions with others. Whereas
research has shown that infants from their Wrst year of life
use information about another agent’s past behavior and
their own action experiences to predict or understand
others’ actions (Paulus et al. 2011a; Sommerville and
Woodward 2005), it has remained an open question how
children process others’ action capabilities, i.e., action-
related information when no ongoing action is presented.
Our Wnding that 3.5-year-old children but not 2.5-year-old
children are able to do so indicates that having an under-
standing of others’ action capabilities is a more complex
computation (i.e., a rather abstract evaluation of what
somebody could do, if he would act in a certain situation)
than predicting, for example, the goal of an ongoing
action. Our Wndings are, therefore, informative for theories
on the development of social understanding (e.g., Barresi
and Moore 1996).
Our results also inform current research on the develop-
ment of children’s developing ability to engage in success-
ful joint actions. To eVectively collaborate with other
people in joint activities, one must be able to take another
person’s physical action capabilities into account (Sebanz
et al. 2006). Our Wndings provide evidence that this essen-
tial social-cognitive ability for successful joint action
develops around 3 years of age. Together with recent stud-
ies showing that other crucial social-cognitive abilities for
the ability to engage in successful joint actions develop
around 3 years of life (forming joint commitment: Gräfenh-
ain et al. 2009; action coordination: Meyer et al. 2010), our
results suggest thus that by approximately 3 years of age
children have developed the necessary social-cognitive pre-
requisites to successfully cooperate with others.
Taken together, the present study extends current knowl-
edge by showing that children from at least 3.5 years of age
on are able to perceive others’ physical action capabilities
and that 5-year-olds, but not younger children are able to
adequately reason about others’ action capabilities.
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